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Abstract It is rather uncontroversial that there are different ways to report de se
attitudes, but there is still disagreement about the number and the nature of the
different mechanisms at work. Following Anand (2006), I distinguish three types of
de se reporting: one a special case of de re, another expressed by shifted indexicals,
and a third expressed by dedicated de se pronouns. For the first two I propose
reductions to de re and de dicto reporting, respectively, couched in a dynamic
framework where presupposition resolution takes center stage. For the third, I part
ways with all current proposals in offering what is essentially a de re analysis of
dedicated de se pronouns. I motivate this radical departure with examples of de se
pronouns binding de re reflexives, as recently brought into the spotlight by Charlow
(2010) and Sharvit (2010).
Keywords: attitude reports; de dicto, de re, de se; shifted indexicals; presupposition; control;
reflexives
1 Introduction
Sentences that report what someone thinks, wants, hopes etc. are called attitude
reports. They typically take the form of an attitude verb that relates an individual
and a proposition: x believes/hopes/. . . (that) ϕ . Linguists and philosophers have
long studied logical distinctions between different modes of reporting and their
linguistic correlates. The best known is the distinction between de re and de dicto.
In a de dicto report the complement clause expresses a proposition toward which
the reported speaker is claimed to have a certain attitude. On a de dicto reading
of (1), for instance, John is ascribed a desire to date whoever wins a certain TV
competition:
(1) John wants to date the winner of America’s Next Top Model.
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But this report has a second reading where what he wants is to date Chelsey, who we
happen to know has just become America’s Next Top Model. On this de re reading,
John’s attitude is directed toward an actual, specific individual (the res). Crucially,
the de re ascription is felicitous even if John himself is unaware of Chelsey’s
participation in the show; the definite description is then merely the reporter’s way
of picking out that individual.
What makes de re attitudes interesting is that someone can have different,
seemingly inconsistent de re attitudes about the same res. In particular, John can
have a de re attitude about himself without realizing that it is about himself, for
instance when he points to a TV screen saying, “That guy has to lose”, without
realizing he’s looking at a recording of himself. This is an instance of a de re belief
about oneself as a third person, and it can be reported with a normal de re report
like John hopes that he himself will lose. De se beliefs, in contrast, are beliefs about
oneself as oneself, i.e. beliefs that the ascribee himself would express in the first
person.1
Languages have a number of different ways to report de se attitudes. There is
considerable debate about the number and the nature of the different mechanisms at
work. According to Anand, for instance, there are three distinct ‘routes to de se’,
exemplified by the classic examples in (2):
(2) a. Kaplan believes that his pants are on fire.
[
Kaplan 1989
]
b. jˇon jˇ@gna n@-ññ y1l-all.
‘Johni says that Ii am a hero.’
[
Amharic, Schlenker 2003
]
c. Pavarotti crede di essere in pericolo.
‘Pavarotti believes to be in danger.’
[
Italian, Chierchia 1989
]
For the first two routes, I propose reductions to de re (section 3.1) and de dicto
(section 3.2), respectively. These reductions are couched in a dynamic framework
where presupposition resolution takes center stage (section 2). In this I follow my
earlier proposals (esp. Maier 2010), but I add some new supporting evidence and
illustrations.
For the third route, I part ways with all current proposals in proposing a route 1,
de re, analysis of dedicated de se pronouns. I motivate this radical departure with
examples of de se pronouns binding de re reflexives, as recently brought into the
spotlights by Charlow (2010) and Sharvit (2010).
1 In fact, de se naturally extends beyond the first person to other forms of irreducible indexicality.
However, in this paper I will restrict attention to the first person case.
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2 Presupposition and the de re / de dicto distinction
The de re/de dicto ambiguity allows a natural formalization in terms of presuppo-
sition resolution: local resolution of a presupposition triggered inside an attitude
corresponds to de dicto, global to de re. In addition, Quine (1956) and Kaplan (1968)
showed that de re ascription requires a descriptive mode of presentation, given by
the actual acquaintance relation between subject and res. Combining these insights,
I propose an analysis where presuppositions that move out of an attitude operator
trigger an acquaintance presupposition that searches the context for an appropriate
mode of presentation for the attitude’s res.
2.1 Presupposing res
In this section I discuss a classic scope paradox known to plague simple scopal
accounts of the de re/de dicto distinction. I apply the argumentation of Romoli &
Sudo (2009) to bring out the superiority of a presuppositional version of the scope
theory.
Bäuerle’s (1983) scope paradox exploits the interaction between an indefinite
and a universal quantifier inside an attitude report. Keshet (2008:31) presents the
following Americanized version:
A man named George is passing a bus and hears a woman with a
distinct South Carolina accent yelling from inside: “I love all y’all!”
Unbeknownst to him, the entire Boston Red Sox team is on the bus,
on their way to a game. Additionally, the woman is not from South
Carolina, at all, but rather she is from Tennessee.
(3) George thinks a woman from South Carolina loves every Red Sox player.
On the intended2 reading of (3), the existential takes wide scope over the universal
(one woman has the property of loving every player). On the other hand, the
universal quantifier is de re (George doesn’t know they are Red Sox players), and
the existential de dicto (we know the woman is not from South Carolina). This is
impossible on the scopal account that equates de re and de dicto with wide and
narrow scope, respectively.
2 As pointed out to me by Itamar Francez and Janneke Huitink, the inverse scope reading where the ex-
istential takes scope under the universal is weaker, and hence also true in the context sketched. More-
over, that reading is not paradoxical: ∀x RedSoxplayer(x)→ believe(g)[∃ y SCwoman(y)∧love(x,y)].
This would be a plausible reading of George thinks every Red Sox player is loved by some woman
from South Carolina. Still, given the context (3) surely expresses the stronger reading: one woman
loves all players. To support this intuition, note that we can pick up the discourse referent representing
this woman in George’s doxastic state with, He thinks she’s hot.
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The standard solution is to replace the scope theory with a more finegrained
analysis in terms of intensional variables. All descriptive expressions carry an
explicit world variable and attitudes can bind these, yielding de dicto readings, or
leave them open for a de re reading. The intended readings of the scope paradoxes
above are easily captured in this system, because de re/de dicto is now independent
of quantifier scope:
(4) George thinks λw a womanw [from South Carolina]w lovesw every [Red Sox
player]w0 .
The intensional system however runs into the opposite problem: overgeneration.
Only very few of the theoretically possible world indexings are ever instantiated. To
narrow it down a number of grammatical constraints on world indexing have been
proposed (Sauerland 2001; Keshet 2008).
For instance, the presuppositional DP constraint (Keshet 2008) says that the
world variables of non-presuppositional DPs must be bound by the nearest lambda:
i.e. de dicto. This captures the contrast in (5): the numerical quantifier in (5a) has a
strong, presuppositional reading which licenses de re construal, but there are in (5b)
forces a weak, non-presuppositional construal, which can only be read de dicto:
(5) a. Mary believes three professors are still in college.
[
Keshet 2008
]
b. #Mary believes there are three professors still in college.
The DP-in-DP constraint (Romoli & Sudo 2009) says that DPs that contain
smaller DPs can only be read de re if the embedded DP is also de re. This is needed
to rule out the indexing in (6b), which would incorrectly make (6a) felicitous:
(6) Unicorns don’t exist, but Mary thinks she saw a unicorn the other day. Also,
a. #Mary thinks [DP1the man who likes [DP2the unicorn]] is a woman.[
Romoli & Sudo 2009
]
b. Mary thinks λw the manw0 who likes the unicornw is a womanw.
These and other indexing constraints seem ad hoc on the intensional variables
account. Yet they all follow naturally from a presuppositional account of the de
re/de dicto distinction. The presuppositional account is like the naïve scopal account
except that scope is not just a matter of syntactic movement or structural ambiguity,
but derived in a dynamic semantic/pragmatic framework from the independently
motivated presupposition resolution mechanisms. Definites trigger presuppositions
that want to project out of the local triggering context, unless the discourse context
prefers local resolution. The end result of a global resolution with respect to an
attitude operator is simply a wide scope representation, i.e. de re. Local resolution
gives narrow scope, de dicto outputs.
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The presupposition theory I am going to need uses the representational frame-
work of DRT (van der Sandt 1992). In this framework, a syntactic module called the
construction algorithm turns a sentence into a preliminary DRS. Next, the seman-
tic/pragmatic resolution algorithm connects this preliminary representation to the
common ground representation, yielding an updated common ground as output.
Take the ambiguous report from the introduction:
(7) John wants to date the winner of America’s Next Top Model.
We represent presuppositions in preliminary DRSs’s as dashed boxes:
(8) WANT(j):
date(j,x)
x
antmwin(x)
Resolution starts by trying to bind the presupposition. If we assume an empty
initial common ground, there is no salient ANTM winner to bind to, so we must
accommodate. Global accommodation gives the wide scope output (9a), while local
accommodation gives narrow scope:
(9) a.
x
antmwin(x)
WANT(j): date(j,x)
b. WANT(j):
x
antmwin(x)
date(j,x)
The advantage of the presuppositional account is that the de re/de dicto distinction is
reduced to the central dynamic mechanism of presupposition resolution. Moreover,
presupposition theory shows a way out of the scope paradoxes. To see this, note that
strong quantifiers in DRT presuppose their domains. In this way, the quantificational
force of every remains in situ, while its domain, the set of Red Sox players, is
analyzed as a presupposition that can be interpreted de re:
(10) George thinks a woman from South Carolina loves every Red Sox player.
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BEL(g)
x
SCwoman(x)
y
y∈Y
Y
RedSox(Y)
@
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
∀
y x love y
Y
RedSox(Y)
BEL(g)
x
SCwoman(x)
y
y∈Y @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
∀
y x love y
The advantage over the intensional variables theory is that we don’t need any
of the stipulative indexing constraints. The presuppositional DP constraint is a
giveaway. The nested DP constraint falls out as a case of what van der Sandt (1992)
calls ‘trapping’: if the embedded DP is resolved locally, global resolution of the
containing DP is blocked because it would create unbound variables.
(11) #Mary thinks [DP1the man who likes [DP2the unicorn]] is a woman.
BEL(m):
woman(x)
x
man(x)
like(x,y)
y
unicrn(y)
BEL(m):
y
unicrn(y)
woman(x)
x
man(x)
like(x,y)
*
x
man(x)
like(x,y)
BEL(m):
y
unicrn(y)
woman(x)
2.2 Presupposing acquaintance
The account of 2.1 fixes some shortcomings of the naive scope theory, but leaves
some more substantial vulnerabilities wide open. In previous work I’ve shown how
presupposition theory can be called on yet again to solve the so-called puzzle of
double vision and related phenomena involving res that are known under different
guises. Quine illustrates the problem with the well-worn example of Ralph, who
is acquainted with a gray-haired man whom he considers “rather a pillar of the
community”—certainly no spy. However, we know that this man is really the spy
B.J. Ortcutt. So we can report Ralph’s de re belief as (12a). At the same time, Ralph
is acquainted with a suspicious figure with a brown hat that he glimpsed in a dark
alley. Crucially, we, but not Ralph, are aware that the object of this second belief is
the same Ortcutt, so (12b) is also true:
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(12) a. Ralph believes Ortcutt is not a spy.
b. Ralph believes Ortcutt is a spy.
In the theories discussed so far, (12a) and (12b) cannot both be true. To resolve
the paradox we need to take into account the modes of presentation of a res: Ralph
believes of Ortcutt as the gray-haired guy that he’s not a spy, but he believes of
Ortcutt as the guy in the alley that he is a spy. The relevant modes of presentation
are given by a relation of acquaintance between subject and res: Ralph is acquainted
with Ortcutt as the guy in the alley and he believes that the person he is so acquainted
with is a spy. For convenience I’ll abbreviate P( ιv. R(i,v)) (“the person I am R-
acquainted with has property P”) as PR, where the i in the definiens denotes the de
se “center”, the subject of consciousness, of the attitude.
I have argued elsewhere against the standard solution where the syntax of de re
reporting introduces existential quantification over acquaintance relations, which in
turn determine modes of presentation. Instead, in my view, a de re report triggers an
acquaintance presupposition that wants to be bound globally, but can occasionally
accommodate or resolve locally.3
The next step is to combine this with the insight of 2.1 that de re itself comes
about by global resolution of a definite presupposition. Technically, the mechanism
of acquaintance presupposing is best built into the resolution algorithm:4 if a pre-
supposition, during its search for an antecedent along its projection path, crosses an
attitude boundary, it triggers the introduction of an acquaintance presupposition that
will also try to find an antecedent, in this case, an acquaintance relation between
subject and res. The intuition is that attitudes are a special type of embedding—not
only is their model-theoretic semantics intensional, they also affect presupposi-
tion resolution in a special way in order to avoid creating ‘singular propositions’
(responsible for Ortcutt failures).
I illustrate the framework with (12b) (details in Maier 2010). First, a definite
(the name Ortcutt) triggers a presupposition that projects out of its local context.
In its projection path it crosses an attitude operator, which triggers the creation
of an acquaintance presupposition relating subject and (presuppositional) res, and
corresponding adjustment of the belief content (spy(x) becomes spyR).
3 In earlier work (e.g. Maier 2010) I motivate my use of Van der Sandt’s representational, dynamic
theory of presuppositions, by showing how solving puzzles with quantified and iterated attitudes in
particular requires a unified theory of binding and both global and non-global accommodation.
4 Technically, rather different formalizations are possible. For instance, we could try to build ac-
quaintance presuppositions into the preliminary presuppositional representation of all definites (or
all definites inside attitudes) in such a way that they would usually resolve trivially and disappear,
unless an attitude boundary is crossed. Since this would still require that attitude embeddings treat
presuppositions differently than other embeddings, I opt for the most economical option.
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(13) BEL(r):
spy(x)
x
ortcutt(x)
R
R(r,x)
x
ortcutt(x)
BEL(r): spyR
Now we bind the original res presupposition to the contextually given Ortcutt (x=o),
and look for a salient perceptual relation between Ralph and Ortcutt as antecedent
for R. By a process of higher-order unification (Maier 2006) we can extract from the
context the relation of seeing someone in a dark alley with a hat. Binding R to that
gives us the proper output, where the belief ascribed to Ralph is that the guy in the
alley is a spy:
x=o
R=λyλz . y sees z in dark alley with hat. . .
BEL(r): spyR
3 Two basic routes to de se
Equality is an acquaintance relation, so de se is a subspecies of de re (Lewis 1979).
In addition, there are languages where de se interpretations can come about by local,
de dicto resolution of an indexical. In either case it seems no dedicated de se syntax
is necessary, against the received view.
3.1 Route 1: de se as de re
Pronouns trigger presuppositions that have to be bound, so John thinks he’s a hero
ascribes to John a de re belief about himself. In this case, subject and res coincide,
so we can get de se truth conditions by binding the de re acquaintance relation to
equality.
An important constraint on acquaintance resolution says that, whenever subject
and res coincide, as above, this binding to equality is the preferred option. Only
if the context makes available another self-acquaintance relation (e.g. for Kaplan’s
(2a), man seen on TV – who unbeknownst to Kaplan is Kaplan himself) can we bind
to that to get the (non-de se) de re reading.
With this constraint in place, the presuppositional account is exceptionally well
suited to deal with puzzles involving quantified de re reports. I illustrate the system
by applying it to Anand’s (2006) version of Percus & Sauerland’s (2003) puzzle
involving quantified reports in mixed de re/de se contexts.
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Let’s go back to the ANTM context. Imagine Chelsey, Jane and Ann being
shown the results of their latest photoshoot. Chelsey takes a look and sobs, “I can’t
do it, it’s over for me.” We can report her de se belief as in (14a). Jane and Ann
do not suffer such lack of self-confidence. Not recognizing themselves in their
photos, but not liking what they see, they each exclaim something like “Ugh, she
looks awful! She’ll be eliminated for sure!” Without realizing it, Jane and Ann thus
express de re beliefs about themselves, which we can felicitously report, somewhat
tongue-in-cheek, as in (14b-c).
(14) a. Chelsey thinks she’ll be eliminated.
b. Jane thinks she’ll be eliminated (but she doesn’t realize it).
c. Ann thinks she’ll be eliminated (but she doesn’t realize it).
Zimmermann has noted that in such a mixed de re/de se scenario (15a) is felicitous:
intuitively, every girl has a (de re) belief that she herself should be eliminated.
Anand, following Percus & Sauerland, notes that (15b) is false, because (intuitively)
although one might say that Jane and Ann do not have beliefs about themselves,
surely we cannot deny that Chelsey thinks she’ll be eliminated.5
(15) a. Each girl thinks she’ll be eliminated.
b. #No girl thinks she’ll be eliminated.
Now Chelsey, the pessimistic one, is indeed voted out, leaving Ann and Jane. In
this reduced context, the universal report is still true, but, interestingly the negative
report becomes felicitous as well:
(16) a. Each girl thinks she’ll be eliminated.
b. Neither girl thinks she’ll be eliminated.
5 Additionally, we have the following unquantified intuitions (Hotze Rullmann p.c.):
(i) a. #Chelsey thinks she won’t be eliminated.
b. {Ann/Jane} thinks she won’t be eliminated.
The acceptability of (ib) is straightforwardly derived by global binding of R to equality, the default
resolution. As for (ia), binding to equality does lead to falsity, and there is no other salient self-
acquaintance to bind to. However, according to the anaphoric theory of presupposition we should then
consider global accommodation. The result would be a rather weak reading: ∃ R [ R(c,c) ∧ thinks(c):
[ ¬ elimR] ]. This is already true if we can find one self-acquaintance under which Chelsey thinks
she won’t be eliminated. If we add to the scenario that Chelsey looks at another picture of herself
which she does not recognize and says, “Well, I will be eliminated, but SHE will not” the global
accommodation reading of (ia) would seem to come out true. But then, if the mistaken self-identity is
made explicit in such a way, (ia) actually becomes entirely felicitous. In sum, I’m not sure about the
felicity conditions of (ia) and whether or not the global accommodation option is problematic (and if
so, whether it may be excluded on other pragmatic grounds).
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Apparently, de se is more than just one among the many possible de re reports about
the self: all three beliefs in the scenario above are de re about oneself, yet only
Chelsey’s de se belief has the power to falsify the negative report.
This is, in essence, what leads Percus & Sauerland (2003) to postulate a dedi-
cated, syntactic de se LF: (16b) is true under the ‘think-de se’ LF, but (15b) is false
with both the general de re LF (for none of the girls there is an acquaintance rela-
tion. . . ) and the dedicated think-de se LF (none of the girls have a de se belief. . . ).
Indeed, simply assimilating de se to de re under the acquaintance of equality cannot
give us the truth of (16b).
The presuppositional reduction that I propose, however, is slightly more sophis-
ticated than that. It can account for the facts reported above, without postulating a
special de se LF. The universal sentences follow the following resolution path: the
pronoun she moves up to get bound by the quantifier, which triggers the introduction
of an acquaintance presupposition featuring the quantified variable as subject and
res. Given this dependence on the non-global quantified variable, it is trapped inside
the quantifier:
x
girl(x) @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Q
x
BEL(x):
elim(y)
y
she(y)
x
girl(x) @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Q
x
R
R(x,x)
BEL(x): elimR
Now we try binding R to equality first. The result is false for (15a,b) and (16a) in
the associated contexts, but true for (16b):
x
R==
girl(x)
@
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
no
x
BEL(x): elimR
For the first three we look for other antecedent R’s, but given the local trapping, there
are none, so we have to accommodate, locally (global is out because of trapping,
intermediate accommodation is truth-conditionally equivalent to local in this case):
x
girl(x) @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Q
x
R
R(x,x) BEL(x): elimR
This output is true for (15a) and (16a), but (16b) is still false. At this point we’ve
exhausted the resolution options, and we have established exactly the observed
pattern.
To conclude this discussion it would be interesting to compare it with Anand’s
analysis, for he too denies Percus & Sauerland’s conclusion that there is a special
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de se LF at work here. In his words, what the data tells us is that the acquaintance
relation of equality, i.e. the de se “can never be taken off the table.” I’m inclined to
disagree. Having first established that acquaintance relations are best analyzed as
contextually determined, more specifically, as presuppositions (Abusch 1997; Aloni
2000; Maier 2006), it is clear that under contextual pressure, equality can indeed be
taken off the table. A simple de re report like (2a) or (14b) can be true in a mistaken
identity scenario precisely because the equality/de se preference gets overruled,
under considerable contextual pressure. In my view de se is indeed more difficult to
ignore than any other acquaintance. In global contexts there is the preference alluded
to above. But local contexts, such as a quantifier’s restrictor in the examples above,
will not often provide sufficient information to extract any meaningful acquaintance
relation, so indeed equality then becomes the only option short of accommodation.
This works because equality is the ‘universal acquaintance’: everyone is always
self-identical. Binding to equality in a local context does not require anything more
than a discourse referent denoting a person, because we can safely assume that
everybody is always acquainted with the person she is, as the person she is.
3.2 Route 2: de se as de dicto
According to Kaplan (1989), English I is an indexical and hence directly referential:
it always refers to the one who utters it. This is not true in all languages. For
example, in Amharic (Schlenker 2003; Anand 2006) and Zazaki (Anand & Nevins
2004), first person forms embedded in attitude and/or indirect speech reports can
refer to the attitude holder instead of the actual speaker:
(17) jˇon
John
jˇ@gna
hero
n@-ññ
be.PRES-1s
y1l-all
say-3sm
‘John says he’s a hero’
[
Amharic, Schlenker 2003
]
The phenomenon whereby an embedded first person refers to its local attitude center
rather than to the actual speaker is known as ‘shifted indexicality’. Crucially, as
Schlenker and Anand have shown, shifted indexicals are necessarily interpreted de
se: (17) is false if John said “That guy on TV is a hero!”, without realizing he is
pointing at an image of himself. For detailed discussion of these data in light of
Kaplan’s ‘prohibition of monsters’, see Anand 2006 and Schlenker 2011.
Shifted indexicals like the first person in (17) pose a challenge for the route 1
analysis of de se as de re: de re means global resolution of I, which gets us only the
reading where John is talking about me. In my 2006 thesis I nonetheless tried to
force shifted indexicals down the de re route. But given the presuppositional analysis
of the de re/de dicto distinction, a much simpler de dicto analysis presents itself (cf.
Maier 2010). The second route to de se then consists in binding shifted Amharic I
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locally to the implicit attitude center (i):
(18) SAY(j)
hero(x)
x
1s(x)
SAY(j)
i
x=i
hero(x)
The new data below vindicate the de se-as-de dicto approach. The argument
involves, again, the phenomenon of trapping: if a presupposition triggered inside
a larger DP is bound de dicto it forces the larger DP to be read de dicto as well.
Reducing indexical shift to de dicto resolution thus predicts that shifting the pos-
sessor in (19) leads to a de dicto reading of the larger DP, which is pragmatically
unacceptable. This prediction is borne out; only the unshifted reading is available:
(19) l@mma
Lemma
ya
that
ask’@yyami-w
ugly-DEF
makina-y@
car-my
k’ondÿo
beautiful
n@w
be.3m
al-@
say.PF-3m
‘Lemma said that ugly car of {mine/*his} is beautiful’
[
Amharic, M. Amberber p.c.
]
In sum, the second route to de se is characterized by an indexical, analyzed as a
presupposition, that gets bound by the local attitude center. To make this work we
assume these centers to be present in every attitude representation. Finally, to prevent
shifted readings for English I, every analysis needs to stipulate a crosslinguistically
variable ‘monster prohibition parameter’. In our framework the most natural place for
such a parameter is in the presupposition resolution algorithm: English indexicals
must have widest possible scope, while Amharic ones consider local options as
well.6,7
4 De se pronouns
The two distinct ways of deriving de se truth conditions presented above exhaust
the possibilities offered by standard presupposition resolution: a presupposition
triggered inside an attitude can either resolve globally, yielding de re (= de se if
the acquaintance presupposition gets bound to equality), or locally, yielding de
dicto (= de se if the original definite was a first person indexical). In this section
we look at another class of de se ascription that differs from route 1 de se in
being unambiguously de se, and from route 2 de se in involving no first person
6 This is in line with the growing recognition of a more finegrained distinction between various kinds
of presupposition-like projection behaviors (Beaver, Roberts, Simons & Tonhauser 2011).
7 Maier (2009) derives the often observed restriction on indexical shift to attitude contexts from a
two-dimensional representation and semantics of direct reference.
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indexicals (shifted or otherwise). Eventually, I propose a slight modification of route
1 to capture the data, including a surprising interaction between control and overt
reflexives.
4.1 PRO and logophors
De se readings can also come about through the use of dedicated de se pronouns. In
English we find these in control structures like (2c) (repeated below):
(20) Pavarotti crede di essere in pericolo.
≈ Pavarotti believes to be in danger.
Reports like this are unambiguously de se: (20) is false if Pavarotti is watching
himself on TV and exclaims, “That guy is in danger!” The de se pronoun here is the
unpronouced subject of the embedded clause, PRO, which is said to be controlled
by the matrix subject (a case of what syntacticians call ‘obligatory subject control’).
In some West-African languages, logophoric pronouns (Clements 1975) appear
to be the overt realizations of de se pronouns (Schlenker 2003; Anand 2006):
(21) ó
he
so
say
pé
that
oun
3sg.LOG
r’i
see
John
John
he said he saw John
[
Yoruba, Anand 2006:56
]
Again, this sentence is only felicitous if the reported utterance was in the first person
(e.g. “Hey, I saw John!”).
For the purposes of this paper I will disregard putative further examples of
de se pronouns, such as (some) long-distance reflexives and (some) third person
pronouns in dream reports. Moreover, I will ignore the so-called ‘de re blocking
effect’ (Anand 2006), the apparently syntactic restriction against dedicated de se
pronouns occurring in the c-command domain of a de re pronoun in a report.8 The
point I want to make about de re and de se pronouns in this paper involves PRO and
English reflexives, for which, given the positional restrictions on PRO, the supposed
blocking configurations never arise. I will leave it for future research whether and
what syntactic restrictions should be incorporated to account for overt de se pronouns
in other languages and in dream reports.
Given that there are ways to unambiguously express de se truth conditions, the
question arises, can we somehow assimilate this type of de se reporting to route 1
or route 2 derivations, or do we need to postulate an entirely new third route? The
8 Although the judgments are rather delicate (Anand reports that 10 out of 25 English speakers were
not subject to the blocking effect with ‘dream report third person de se pronouns’ at all), Anand uses
them to motivate his syntactic third route to de se.
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latter option is prevalent in the de se literature, usually in the form of a syntactic
(non-presuppositional) ‘shortcut’ in which PRO refers directly to, or is syntactically
bound by, the attitude center. Below I present a new presuppositional take on the
neglected first option: PRO, like he, is a third person pronoun that gets bound outside
the attitude, creating a de re acquaintance presupposition in the process.
4.2 De se pronouns and reflexives
First let’s discuss some problems for the alternative analyses. A route 2 analysis is
refuted by considering the semantic features of PRO and logophors. Unlike Amharic
I the de se pronouns discussed in the literature all seem to agree with their matrix
antecedent. For the African logophoric pronouns this is clear: in third person reports,
logophors are all glossed as bearing third person features. As for controlled PRO,
we can’t see its features directly, but we can visualize them by letting PRO bind a
local reflexive (cf. Schlenker 2003):
(22) John hopes PRO to buy {himself/*myself/*herself} a car.
Even if John thinks he’s a woman (or hopes to become one), and the reflexive is
read de se (the preferred but not the only reading, see below), we have to use the
masculine, third person form. Now, according to Binding Theory, a reflexive must be
bound locally, in this case by PRO. Furthermore, binding requires matching features,
so the route 2 analysis, where de se is derived from a first person pronoun, cannot
work for PRO.
The commonly accepted route 3 is harder to refute. However, the recent interest
in constructions like (22), where PRO binds a reflexive, (inadvertently) provides
some counter evidence. In the relevant examples a PRO-bound reflexive is interpreted
de re (Heim 1994; Charlow 2010; Sharvit 2010). Take Charlow’s journal editor who
doesn’t recognize her own paper, but thinks it should be accepted:
(23) Molly wants PRO to accept a paper by herself.
We can even add a de re expressive and use the trapping argument of (19) to reaffirm
that de re reflexive in these cases still amounts to global resolution:
(24) Molly wants to publish that stupid old paper of herself.
In this case, Molly doesn’t think the paper is stupid, nor does she realize it is her
own. If the PRO-bound reflexive were somehow to remain inside the attitude, it
would trap the expressive yielding only a nonsensical full de dicto interpretation
(Molly wants to publish a paper that she believes to be stupid, old and her own).
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So, in (23) and (24): (i) PRO is de se; (ii) PRO binds herself; (iii) herself is de
re; and (iv) de re requires global resolution. This is puzzling when you follow a
standard route 3 account of de se PRO as a nonpresuppositional entity that lives
inside the report clause: how come the local PRO doesn’t bind and trap the reflexive
inside the attitude? To answer this question, existing accounts are forced to modify
Binding Theory. After the initial observations and formulations of this puzzle by
Heim and Charlow, Sharvit has recently proposed just such a radical modification of
Binding Theory. In her revision a special kind of covaluation is stipulated to hold
between local, de se PRO and global, de re reflexive.
In the next section I propose a more conservative solution which reconciles
standard Binding Theory with (i)–(iv). The trick is to handle de se pronouns via (a
restricted) route 1 derivation.
4.3 Proposal: syntactically restricted de re resolutions
The proposal now on the table is that dedicated de se pronouns like PRO and
African logophors are to be treated essentially like regular third person pronouns. In
particular, dedicated de se pronouns trigger presuppositions that get bound outside
the attitude. The difference is that PRO and logophors bear a feature log that
tells the resolution algorithm to add a restriction to equality to the acquaintance
presupposition that gets triggered by its de re resolution. To see how this works we
will go through the key examples discussed above.
The starting point of the analysis is that PRO triggers a pronominal presupposi-
tion with an additional log feature. Its semantic features it inherits from the matrix
subject via the syntactic control relation, as brought out by the discussion of (22)
above. I assume that establishing the relevant control relation and the subsequent
transfer of features from matrix subject (or object) to PRO is a purely syntactic affair.
In DRT that means that these mechanisms are built into the construction algorithm.
So when the semantic/pragmatic resolution process starts, PRO already bears a third
person feature, immediately barring a local route 1 resolution to the belief center:
(25) Pavarotti believes PRO
control
to be in danger.
BEL(p)
x
3sg.m(x)
log
danger(x)
The presupposition has to be bound globally/de re, to its controller Pavarotti. Cross-
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ing the attitude, it triggers the introduction of an acquaintance presupposition. The
effect of the log feature is to instruct the resolution algorithm that any acquaintance
presupposition generated by it carries a restriction to equality. Technically, the part
of the algorithm dealing with acquaintance presupposition generation must check
for the presence of log-features. Concretely, resolution of the preliminary DRS in
(25) proceeds as in (26). We bind x to p and R to = and get exactly the de se output.
R
R(p,x)
R==
x
3sm(x)
BEL(p) dangerR BEL(p) danger=
At this point, I should follow Anand’s (p.c.) suggestion and compare the current ap-
proach with a prima facie similar PRO-as-de re approach due to Schlenker (2003:95-
96) (who in turn credits a suggestion by B. Schein). Schlenker briefly discusses the
possibility of analyzing control structures as general de re by “simply adding in the
logical form a predicate that specifies the nature of the acquaintance relation [so that]
‘Smith hopes PRO to be elected’ is true if and only if Smith hopes, of Smith, that he
should be elected, under the description (the acquaintance relation): ‘I’.” The feature
log in the current proposal seems to play precisely the role of such an acquaintance
predicate. Beyond this general characterization, however, our proposals diverge
substantially. Schlenker splits up the features of PRO: there’s a first person feature
that gets interpreted locally (like Amharic I, i.e. route 1), but gender gets interpreted
globally (de re, i.e. route 2). In my proposal, this “unsettling” (p.96) feature splitting
is avoided: PRO shares all features with its global antecedent. In addition, log is
interpreted as a resolution restriction on acquaintance relations.9
Now, on to the more interesting examples, involving reflexives. I assume reflexive
binding, like control, is taken care of in syntax. In DRT terms, the reflexive’s local
antecedent is identified during the construction of the preliminary DRS. Note that
the construction algorithm now requires modules for establishing both control and
local binding relations.
(26) John hopes P
control
RO to buy himself
binding
a car.
What the data on PRO-bound de re reflexives teaches us is that pre-semantic
9 Nonetheless, my approach does owe a great debt to discussions with Philippe Schlenker.
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binding does not preclude projection behavior. In (23), the bound reflexive appears
to move up and create an acquaintance presupposition of its own:
(27) Molly wants P
control
RO to accept a paper by herself
binding
.
Reflexives, I propose, trigger syntactically restricted presuppositions. A reflexive like
herself triggers a presupposition that must corefer with its syntactically determined
local antecedent. The syntactic binding relation sketched in (27) thus ties the
reflexive’s presupposition to PRO’s in the preliminary DRS:
(28) WANT(m):
x publish y
x
3sg.f(x)
log
y
3sg.f(y)
y=x
Normally such a restriction leaves little room for the presupposition resolution
process, but here the local antecedent is itself a presupposition, so when PRO moves
out of the attitude, it drags the reflexive with it. Eventually both end up bound to
Molly, but not before each has introduced its own acquaintance presupposition:
(29)
R
R==
x
3sg.f(x)
R’
R’(m,y)
y
3sg.f(y)
y=x
WANT(m) RpublishR’
Note how the acquaintance presupposition (R) created by PRO is restricted to
equality, while that created by the bound reflexive (R’) remains unconstrained. This
explains why PRO must be read de se while the bound reflexive need not be. As
with all route 1 de re pronouns, there will still be a principled preference for de se
resolution (cf. 2.2), which we can see operating in (22). In an explicit mistaken
identity context like (27), however, this preference will be overruled and we get a de
re/non-de se reading.
The rest of the derivation is trivial. First bind x to its controller m (in turn bound
to the contextually salient Molly). Then we can only bind y to m and R to =. R’ will
be bound to the salient relation of reviewing a paper of oneself:
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(30)
R’(m,m)
R’=λxλy. x reviews paper of y
WANT(m): =publishR’
This output captures the desired reading: a de se PRO with contextually de re
reflexive. More specifically, from (30) we can read off that Mary’s want-worlds are
those where the agent/center publishes the paper she just reviewed.
5 Conclusion
The de re/de dicto ambiguity is best described in terms of presupposition: de dicto is
local, and de re is global resolution of a definite with respect to an attitude operator.
The latter case, global resolution, is a little more complicated with attitudes than
with extensional operators, in that, whenever a presupposition projects out of an
attitude, it leaves behind a local mode of presentation to be resolved by a global
acquaintance presupposition linking the report’s subject to its res.
If subject and res coincide, the acquaintance presupposition defaults to equality,
which leads to de se truth conditions. This is the first route to de se. As a challenging
test case, I’ve shown how this pragmatic derivation of de se as a subtype of de re
makes the right predictions in some quantified attitude reports, without resorting to a
dedicated de se LF.
The phenomenon of shifted indexicality, as found in Amharic and other lan-
guages, shows another route to de se. I’ve provided new evidence for an analysis in
terms of a local, de dicto resolution of the Amharic first person indexical.
A third type of de se reports is exemplified by African logophors and controlled
PRO in infinitival reports. I proposed an analysis where these de se pronouns
are treated as regular ‘route 1’ pronouns, except for the fact that they carry a
special feature that tells the resolution algorithm that accompanying acquaintance
presuppositions must be equality. This forces the observed unambiguous de se
interpretation, without the need for deleting the third person features in the semantics.
This analysis of de se pronouns leads to a novel solution to a puzzle involving
de se PRO binding de re reflexives. As for reflexives, I assume that they trigger
presuppositions that are pre-semantically tied to their local syntactic antecedents.
In the puzzle’s configuration we then get two presuppositions triggered inside the
attitude: the first, PRO, resolves globally, and its acquaintance relation must be
equality; the second, the reflexive, is tied to the first and hence must also project
to find its antecedent. The acquaintance presupposition generated by this latter
resolution, however, is not restricted to equality.
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